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Chapter 12: Ethical, Legal and Privacy Considerations for Adaptive Sys-
tems 
Manon Knockaert and Nathan De Vos1 
Abstract:  
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the new EU legal framework 
for the processing of personal data. The use of any information related to an identi-
fied or identifiable person by a software will imply the compliance with this Euro-
pean legislation. The objective of this chapter is to focus on the processing of a 
specific category of personal data: sensitive data (mainly face recognition and voice 
recognition) to verify the user’s identity. Indeed, the GDPR reinforces requirements 
for security measures to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of these personal 
data. We analyze three privacy aspects: the possibility to obtain a valid consent from 
the user, how to ensure the transparency principle and the implication of openness 
and the framework to implement in order to use the feedback given by the system 
to the user. From an ethical point of view, the request for consent is legitimized by 
the existence of a real assessment alternative left to the student. Then the different 
components of the right to transparency are illustrated by examples from the field. 
Finally, the question of feedback is expressed in the form of a dilemma highlighting 
the possible risks of poorly justified decisions due to the way feedback is exposed. 
 
 
Keywords: Biometrics- GDPR – Privacy- Personal Data – Ethics – Consent 
– Transparency - Right to information  
1. Introduction 
As members of the Research Centre in Information, Law and Society (CRIDS), we 
have worked on both the legal and ethical aspects of the TeSLA (Trust-based au-
thentication and authorship e-assessment analysis) project2. As the software is using 
personal data of the students from the involved institutions (face recognition, voice 
recognition and keystroke dynamics), it was necessary to adopt a reflection on both 
the legal and ethical aspects of data processes involved – and this, from the begin-
ning of the project, to ensure that the outcomes are legally valid and well received 
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Our Research Centre is used to dealing with these two aspects both in research and 
development projects. Based upon our experience in the field and long-standing 
reflection on how to make legal and ethical interventions in this context, we have 
adopted a particular stance towards the other members of the project. Indeed, being 
neither engineers nor pedagogues, our expertise could tend to place us on sort of an 
external position. However, our credo is to try to collaborate as much as possible 
with all the partners, despite the diversity of the profiles we have to deal with. This 
modus operandi avoids the trap of an overhanging attitude that would consist in 
prescribing from the outside a series of directly applicable injunctions. We worked 
together with the project members to stimulate collective reflection on a number of 
issues that we found necessary to address. 
 
The legal approach intends to put in place the safeguards required by the law to 
legalize the processing of personal data. The major objective was to implement the 
technical measures to ensure the proportionality, the confidentiality and the security 
of the personal data processes. The first guarantee implemented is that the system 
can only process the data of the students that give their consent. The second major 
guarantee concerns the rules of access. The system must be designed to allow each 
institution to have access only to its own data and only to the relevant data. Further-
more, the system must be designed to facilitate deletion or anonymization of the 
personal data when it is no longer necessary to store the data in a form permitting 
the identification of the student. Next to the technical considerations, the GDPR 
also foresees key principles surrounding the processing of personal data. In this 
chapter, we will mainly focus on this second aspect of the legislation, with a partic-
ular attention to the transparency principle. 
Conversely, the ethicist's contribution is less related to operational aspects. It aims 
more to open the project, to bring a broader point of view to it, to see how the object 
created would interact with the rest of society. The ethical approach highlights hy-
potheses on the various potential impacts of the technology, sheds light on the so-
cietal choices embedded in the object and invites other partners to think about them. 
The product of ethical work therefore takes the form of a reflection rather than a 
recommendation. 
 
For a project such as TeSLA, the legal aspects already provide a solid basis to be 
taken into account to ensure the possibility of implementing the system. However, 
the Law will not necessarily enlighten us about all the critical technical choices 
(especially given the novelty of the object, some legal gaps may exist). The ethical 
approach can also be used to complete the legal approach when it does not have the 
resources to effectively advise partners. In this sense, but also because of the two 
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aspects mentioned above, the legal approach and the ethical approach are comple-
mentary. 
 
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the consent of the students to process 
their personal data. As TeSLA is using biometrics data, it is important to obtain an 
explicit consent. We will analyze the legal conditions to obtain a valid consent and 
how the ethical considerations could reinforce the requirements to have a free, spe-
cific, informed and unambiguous consent. The second part is dedicated to the trans-
parency principle. This principle involves a right for the students to receive specific 
information and a corollary obligation for the data controller to provide that infor-
mation. In this second part of the chapter, we will analyze what information has to 
be given and how they can be adapted to the user. Finally, as a third part, we will 
focus on the result given by the TeSLA system. The result of matching or non-
matching is personal data but ethical considerations could help the teachers to work 
with these indicators. For each part, we will firstly expose the GDPR requirements, 
and secondly explain the ethical considerations.  
 
2. Ethical preliminary remarks 
 
 
Three methodological approaches were undertaken in order to question the project 
from an ethical point of view.  
First of all, a state-of-the-art report was produced regarding the potential social ef-
fects TeSLA could have on the learning and teaching experience. It was based on 
an interdisciplinary approach, ranging from academic texts on e-learning to the so-
ciology of technology. This state of the art aimed to introduce initial reflections with 
a more global aim into the project (both through reports and direct discussions) and 
to get familiar with the subject of study. To this end, our analytical framework was 
informed by the work of key authors in the field of sociology of techniques such as 
Feenberg3 or Akrich4. 
Following this theoretical approach to the above concerns, an ethical fieldwork was 
developed, based on individual semi-structured interviews of teachers and learners 
involved into the pilots (which consist of the experimental and gradual integration 
of the TeSLA system in 7 consortium member universities). These interviews aimed 
to help us to concretely and pragmatically understand the social effects the TeSLA 
project could have on teaching and learning experiences of the participants. Four 
pilot institutions were implicated in the ethical fieldwork: two full distance univer-
sities (the Open University of Catalunya UOC and The Open University of the Neth-




erlands OUNL) and two blended ones (Sofia University SU and the Technical Uni-
versity of Sofia TUS). Dutch OUNL stakeholders were interviewed at the end of 
Pilot 2, the other pilot stakeholders at the end of pilot 3A (not earlier because we 
needed to interview users who tested a sufficiently advanced version of the system). 
The choice of these universities was made to collect contrasted social contexts with 
respect two criteria (distance versus blended Higher Education Institutions HEI – 
technical backgrounds versus humanities backgrounds of teachers and learners). 
Table 1. Interviews conducted in each pilot university 
 
Number of participants UOC   OUNL    SU TUS 
Learners 6 5 1 5 (focus group) 
Teachers 3 3 2 3 
 
Each interview lasted an average of 1.30 hours. Two specific features characterized 
those interviews: first of all, they were based on the TeSLA experience of the inter-
viewees, i.e. their understanding of the system and the activities undertaken with 
the system (what we call ‘situated interviews’). Secondly, they were explorative and 
not representative: the ambition was just to help us to pragmatically understand con-
cerns ‘theoretically’ pointed out by the literature or through the discussions experi-
enced during the project. The number of interviewees is too low to expect some 
statistical representativeness and this is not the point of this study. The aim was to 
discuss, with users of the system (professors and students), the uses they have made 
of a new system. The reactions should allow the technical partners to see how their 
system is received by the public.  
In this respect, the interview methodology is inspired by sociologists such as Kauf-
mann, who claims a very open approach to interviews5. This openness allows inter-
viewees to address the aspects that they consider most relevant and not to confine 
the debate to the interviewer's pre-conceptions. This is how our fieldwork differs 
from other fieldworks accomplished in the context of this project: this methodology 
allows us to report the sense of the practices, the deep reasons why users act a spe-
cific way. It enables us to consider diversity among users and to ask specific ques-
tions according to the issues they are more sensitive about. This wider freedom in 
the way to answer questions presented by our methodology is complementary to the 
pilot partners questionnaires which are more formalized and gather more standard-
ized quantitative data. 
To do this, interview grids were designed: they include a set of sub-themes to ex-
plore in order to deal with the system in a comprehensive way and examples of 
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questions that can help the conversation to move forward (interviewees are not re-
quired to answer each of them if they find them uninteresting). Here are simplified 
versions of these grids both for teachers interviews and students’ interviews. 
Table 2. Teachers’ interview grid 
 
Topic Why approaching it? 
Background of the teacher 
(both global and more specifi-
cally about e-learning) 
Allows a very contextualized analysis 
Understanding of TeSLA 
Observing whether they really understand what 
is TeSLA and how it is supposed to be used is a pre-
requisite to analyse other issues 
Pedagogical integration of 
TeSLA 
Their feeling about the principles of use of the 
system, the different instruments, why did they use 
this/these instrument(s) in place of others... 
Feedback interpretation 
Their use of the numbers sent back by TeSLA. 
Are they a sufficient prove? Are they reliable? 
Monitoring aspect 
The surveillance induced by TeSLA, their even-
tual fear of "slides" 
Defence against a decision 
coming from the system 
What would they do if the system accuses them 
of cheating? Would they like to be added in the sys-
tem to allow this defence? 
Regulation of the judgement 
The relation between the use of TeSLA and the 
internal regulation of institutions, the role allocated 
at the teacher in the management of TeSLA 
 
Table 3. Learners’ interview grid 
 
Topic Why approaching it? 
Background of the learner (both 
global and more specifically about 
e-learning) 
Allows a very contextualized analysis 
Understanding of TeSLA 
Observing whether they really understand 
what is TeSLA and how it is supposed to be 
used is a prerequisite to analyse other issues 
Explanation of the use 
Their feeling about the principles of use of 
the system, the different instruments, and their 
integration with the activities they are asked to 
do... 
Monitoring aspect 
The surveillance induced by TeSLA, their 
eventual fear of "slides” … 
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Defence against a decision com-
ing from the system 
What would they do if the system accuses 
them of cheating? Would they like to be added 
in the system to allow this defence? 
Regulation of the judgement 
How are the teachers supposed to deal with 
the feedbacks sent by TeSLA? 
 
The information collected during the ethical fieldwork have been compared 
(where possible) with the observations from other partners, particularly the data 
collected in the surveys and focus groups organized to assess the pilots experiences, 
to widen our point of view. 
 
3. Legal preliminary remarks 
 Privacy law concern TeSLA. Indeed, the General Data Protection Regulation6 
(hereafter the “GDPR”) defines personal data as “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural 
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference 
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online 
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person”7. TeSLA im-
plies the processing of personal data when using face recognition, voice recognition 
and keystroke dynamics to verify students’ identity during distance exams and ped-
agogical activities. One of the objectives is to develop strong privacy features that 
will prevent unnecessary identification of persons during the e-assessment. The pro-
ject began under the rules of the Directive 95/46/EC
8
 and continued under the 
GDPR which is applicable from 25 May 2018. For the purpose of this chapter, we 
only focus on the processing of face and voice recognition. Indeed, even if keystroke 
dynamics are personal data, they do not fall into the specific category of sensitive 
personal data (see section 5.1.2 of this chapter). 
In order to establish the responsibilities of each partner and the architecture of 
the system, a first step was to identify the data controller and the data processor. 
Let us indicate that the data controller is the natural or legal person that determines 
                                                          
6
 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protec-
tion Regulation), OJ 2016, L 119/1, p. 1. 
7
 Article 4.4 of the GDPR. 
8
 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ 1995, L 281, p. 0031. 
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the means and the purposes of the personal data processing9. When using TeSLA, 
the institutions are the solely responsible for the processing of personal data of their 
students. 
On the other hand, the data processor is the natural or legal person, which processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller
10
. TeSLA is the third party, which develops 
the tools needed to perform the e-assessment. It will be the interface executing the 
privacy filters and sending alerts of fraud detection to the institution. The privacy 
filters are the guarantees developed in the system to ensure the compliance with 
GDPR requirements. 
Each institution willing to use TeSLA is in charge of the major part of the obli-
gations provided by law and is the main contact for data subjects. The obligations 
are mainly: 
- Getting the consent from students. The plug-in, in the university do-
main, verify that the student signed the Consent Form;  
- The internal determination of who can have access to what data, and 
send these rules of access to the TeSLA system. The combination of 
the VLE (Virtual Learning Environment) and LTI (Learning Tools In-
teroperability) provider establish this privacy filter. The infrastructure 
has to be conceived in a way that limits access to the relevant teacher 
and only to the relevant data; 
- The period of retention of personal data by the system; 
- To keep the table of conversion between the TeSLA ID and the real 
identity of students. The TeSLA ID is a unique and secure identifier 
assigned to each student in TeSLA. 
The processing by the data processor must be governed by a binding legal act 
that sets out the subject matter and duration of the processing, the nature and pur-
pose of the processing, the type of personal data and the obligations of each party. 
The data processor can only act if the data controller provides documented instruc-
tions11. 
The project uses a hybrid model of cloud. The TeSLA system has student’s bio-
metric data but only through the coded identity of the students. The institutions, on 
their servers, have the uncoded samples and the table of conversion between the 
TeSLA ID and the real identity of the students. The TIP (TeSLA Identity Provider) 
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 Article 4.7 of the GDPR. 
10
 Article 4.8 of the GDPR. 
11
 Articles 28.1 and 28.3 of the GDPR. 
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converts the identity of the student into a pseudonymized TeSLA ID. The main 
function is to reduce as much as technically possible the identification of unneeded 
information. TeSLA only works with pseudonymised data and it sends the coded 
data to the relevant institution only when there is an abnormality detected during 
the exam. Pseudonymisation means the processing of personal data in such a man-
ner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject with-
out the use of additional information. This additional information needs to be kept 
separately and be subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the 
personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person. On 
the contrary, anonymization means that there is no possibility, with reasonable 
means, to identify a person.  
Each instrument has its own database. It permits to separate the data (face recog-
nition, voice recognition, and keystroke dynamics) in order to send only the relevant 
data to verify the cheating. The combination of TEP (TeSLA E-assessment Portal) 
and the RT (Reporting Tool) constitute service brokers that gather-forward requests 
and learner's data. Furthermore, the system is designed to facilitate deletion or anon-
ymization of the data when it is no longer necessary to store them in a form permit-
ting identification of the corresponding person. Another filter is applied over the 
results. If the instrument does not detect a dishonest behavior, the teacher will not 
have access to the audited data, but only to the score itself. Furthermore, both data 
controller and data processor are in charge of data accuracy. In case of incorrectness, 
they have to take reasonable steps to rectify or erase the concerned personal data
12
. 
The data processor is liable for damages caused by processing which do not com-
ply with the GDPR requirements. TeSLA will also be liable if it has acted outside 
or contrary to lawful instructions of the controller. Nevertheless, a data processor 
will be exempt from any liability if it proves that it is not responsible for the event 
giving rise to the damage13. 
The GDPR considers also the situation where there is more than one controller 
or processor involved in the same processing. Each controller or processor will be 
held liable for the entire damage in order to ensure a full and effective compensation 
for the data subject. The person who has paid full compensation has the possibility 
to claim back from the other controllers or processors involved in the same pro-
cessing the part of the compensation corresponding to their part of responsibility in 
the damage
14
. The division of responsibility is tackled after the full data subject’s 
compensation. 
4. Personal data processing key principles 
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 Article 5.1, d) of the GDPR. 
13
 Articles 82.2 and 82.3 of the GDPR. 
14
 Articles 82.4 and 82.5 of the GDPR. 
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In this section, the aim is not to explain all the legislation but to re-examine the 
general principles of protection in order to understand the next steps in the devel-
opment process. Therefore, we focus on the obligation of transparency, purpose 
limitation, minimization principle, storage limitation and security. All these princi-
ples related to the processing of personal data ensure the lawfulness of each software 
development.   
4.1 Lawfulness, fairness and transparency 
Article 5.1, a) of the GDPR provides that: “Personal data shall be processed 
lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject”. 
The GDPR provides for six legitimate assumptions for data processing. Note that 
the TeSLA project uses biometric data, such as face and voice recognition tools.  
According to the GDPR, biometric data means “personal data resulting from spe-
cific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural 
characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification 
of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data”15. 
These kinds of personal data fall in the special categories of personal data. Conse-
quently, we identified the consent of the student as a way of legitimizing the pro-
cessing, according to article 9 of the GDPR.   
The obligation of transparency requires that the information about the recipient 
or category of recipients of the data must be disclosed to the data subject. It means 
that the student has to be informed about TeSLA as the data processor and has the 
right to access the data processing contract16.  
4.2 Purpose limitation 
Article 5.2, b) of the GDPR provides that: “Personal data shall be collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner 
that is incompatible with those purposes”. For example, biometric data can be useful 
to identify the user of the TeSLA system or to check if the user is cheating or not17. 
In addition, the GDPR prohibits further processing in a manner that is incompatible 
with the original purpose. To determine the lawfulness of a further processing, the 
GDPR establishes a list of factors that should be taken into account. Here are some 
examples of relevant factors (this list is not exhaustive18): 
- The existence of a link between the original purpose and the new one, 
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16. See article 12 of the GDPR. 
17 Notice that the traceability of the learner and the correlation between data collected are 
a process by themselves and need to respect all privacy legislation. Consequently, the student 
must be informed and consent. 
18 Recital 50 of the GDPR. 
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- The context in which the data was collected,  
- The nature of the data and the possible consequences of the processing,  
- And the existence of safeguards such as encryption or pseudonymisation. 
Concerning TeSLA, the purpose could be defined as follow: the personal 
data from students who gave their consent (face recognition, voice recognition and 
keystroke dynamics) will be collected and processed by the institution in order to 
certify the real identity of the student.  
4.3 Minimization principle 
Article 5.1, c) of the GDPR states that: “Personal data shall be adequate, rele-
vant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are 
processed”.  
To analyze the necessity to use biometrics data, we consider whether there are 
less privacy-invasive means to achieve the same result with the same efficacy and 
if the resulting loss of privacy for the students is proportional to any anticipated 
benefit
19
. To minimize the risk, we put in place one database for each instrument to 
avoid the use of a centralized database that could lead to a single point of failure, 
and we use the technique of pseudonymisation
20
.  
Pseudonymisation means “the processing of personal data in such a manner that 
the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the 
use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept sep-
arately and is subject to technical and organization measures to ensure that the 
personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person”21.  
The GDPR encourages the use of this method because it is a technique to imple-
ment privacy by design and by default22. Indeed, the GDPR implements these two 
notions. It implies that the principles of data protection have to be taken into account 
during the elaboration and conception of the system. Furthermore, it may contribute 
to meeting the security obligations23. 
We established that the TeSLA project would adopt a hybrid system, which 
would consist of having pseudonymized (or coded) data in the cloud and uncoded 
data in institution servers (data controller). 
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 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party-WP193 2012, p.8.  
20
 Belgian Commission for the protection of privacy 2008, pp. 14-16. 
21 Article 4.5 of the GDPR. 
22 Article 25 and Recital 58 of the GDPR. 
23 See article 6.4 (e) of the GDPR. 
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4.4. Storage limitation 
Article 5.1, e) of the GDPR states that: “Personal data shall be kept in a form 
which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the 
purposes for which the personal data are processed”. The retention period could be 
the time required to verify the fraud alert if any or the extinction of recourse by the 
student. For each type of collected data and in consideration of the relevant pur-
poses, it is necessary to determine if the personal data needs to be stored or whether 
it can be deleted. 
4.5. Security 
Finally, article 5.1, f) of the GDPR states that: “Personal data shall be processed 
in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including pro-
tection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, 
destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures”. 
In other words, personal data should be processed in a manner that ensures appro-
priate data security. The data processor is also responsible for the security of the 
system, in particular for preventing unauthorized access to personal data used for 
processing such data. The security system should also prevent any illegal/unauthor-
ized use of personal data. The GDPR imposes no specific measure. 
According to article 32 of the GDPR, the data controller and data processor shall 
implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure security of 
personal data, taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation, 
the type of personal data, and the potential risks. According to the GDPR, the data 
processor should evaluate the risks inherent in the processing such as accidental or 
unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, per-
sonal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed, which may lead, in particular, 
to physical, material or non-material damages. 
The GDPR gives some examples of security measures:  
- Pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data; 
 
- The ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availa-
bility, and resilience of processing systems and services; 
 
- The ability to restore the availability and access to personal data in 
a timely manner in the event of a physical or technical incident; 
 
- A process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effec-
tiveness of technical and organizational measures for ensure the se-
curity of the processing. 
5. Consent 
12  
In the TeSLA system, each student has to consent to the processing of his/her bio-
metrics data. In order to be legally valid, the consent needs to fulfil legal obligations. 
These are mainly the obtention of a free, specific, informed and unambiguous con-
sent. Ethical considerations strengthen and reinforce legal obligations arising from 
the GDPR. After describing each of the conditions, we will expose their implemen-
tations in the TeSLA system. 
5.1. Legal considerations 
5.1.1 Definition and objectives 
The GDPR provides that: 'Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent 
that at least one of the following applies: (a)the data subject has given consent to 
the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes". The 
consent of the data subject is: "any freely given, specific, informed and unambigu-
ous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by 
a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data 
relating to him or her". 
The GDPR intends to stop the abusive use of uninformed and uncertain consent. 
In order to ensure a true reflection of individual autonomy, the GDPR has strength-
ened its requirements
24




Consent is also enshrined in Convention 108+. This is currently the only inter-
national legislation on personal data protection26. Having in mind the increase and 
globalization of the use of personal data as well as the vast deployment of technol-
ogies, the Convention 108 wants to give more power to citizens. As stated in the 
Explanatory Report: “A major objective of the Convention is to put individuals in a 
position to know about, to understand and to control the processing of their per-
sonal data by others”27. 
5.1.2. Conditions 
The data controller must therefore prove compliance with four conditions.  
- Free consent 
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 de Terwangne et al. 2017, p. 306. 
25
 Article 4.11 of the GDPR. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party-WP259 
2018. 
26
 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, signed in Strasbourg the 28 January 1981, ETS No.108. 
27
 Explanatory Report, p. 2, pt. 10. Available at : https://rm.coe.int/16808ac91a. 
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The objective is that the data subject has a real choice to consent. To ensure a 
real expression of willingness, three elements must be taken into account: the im-
balance of power, the granularity and the detriment28. Recital 43 states that: « Con-
sent should cover all processing activities carried out for the same purpose or pur-
poses. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all 
of them”. It is up to the controller to determine and specify the different purposes 
pursued and to allow an opt-in of the data subject for each one. Furthermore, if the 
data subject feels compelled, afraid to face negative consequences in case of refusal 
or to be affected by any detriment, the consent will not be considered as freely given. 
As stated in Recital 42, "consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data 




- Specific consent 
Secondly, consent must be specific. In case of multiple purposes for several data 
processing, the data controller must receive a separate consent for each purpose. 
- Informed consent 
Thirdly, the consent must be informed. Articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR list the 
information that the controller must provide to the data subject. At least, it concerns 
information about the data controller’s identity, the purpose of each of the pro-
cessing operations for which consent is needed, the collected and processed data, 
the existence of the rights for the data subject, notably the right to withdraw the 
consent and the transfers of personal data outside the European Union if any. 
The objective is that the person who consents must understand why, how and by 
whom his or her personal data will be collected and used30. The information must 
be concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible. The information has also 
to be given in a clear and plain language, avoiding specialist terminology. There-
fore, the data controller should adopt a user-centric approach and to identify the 
“audience” and ensure that the information is understandable by an average member 
of this audience
31
. As best practice, the Article 29 Working Party encourages the 
data controller to provide an easy access to the information related to the processing 
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 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party-WP259 2018, p.5 and seq. 
29
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party-WP259 2018, pp. 5-10. 
30
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party-WP259 2018, p. 13. 
31
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logue with concerned groups; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party-WP260 2018, p. 7. 
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of personal data. The data controller has also to take into consideration the possibil-
ity to provide express reminders to data subject about the information notice
32
. 
- . Unambiguous consent 
Fourthly, the consent must be unambiguous and must be the result of a declara-
tion by the data subject or a clear positive act. Consent is therefore not presumed. 
In addition to the quality requirements, consent may be withdrawn at any time and 
the GDPR specifies that it must be as easy to withdraw consent as to give it
33
. 
-  Implementation in TeSLA 
In TeSLA, we process biometrics data. As it is information related to an identi-
fied or identifiable person, biometrics data are personal data in the meaning of the 
GDPR. In addition, biometrics data enter into a particular category of personal data: 
sensitive personal data. Sensitive data is defined as data relating to specific infor-
mation on the data subject. These are mainly listed in Article 9 of the GDPR and 
include the personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, reli-
gious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of 
genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, 
data concerning health or data concerning a natural per-son's sex life or sexual ori-
entation. 
For the processing of this special category of personal data - which is in principle 
prohibited - the GDPR requires an explicit consent. It implies that the data subject 
must give an express statement of consent
34
. As examples, the Article 29 Working 
Party recognizes the use of an electronic form, the sending of email or using elec-
tronic signature. The explicit consent implies for the data controller to be careful 
when providing information to the data subject. The institution willing to use 
TeSLA, as data controller, has to ensure that all the necessary information are given 
to the data subject to understand the processing and the personal data used, without 
submerging the data subject with information
35
.  
TeSLA's particularity is the collection of both personal data such as students' 
surnames and first names and special categories of personal data such as face and 
voice recognition. In view of the factual circumstances, consent seems to be the 
only basis for legitimization.  
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The consent form elaborated during the project includes the following infor-
mation: the identity of the controller and of the processor, goals of the project, per-
sonal data collected, purposes, data retention, privacy policy signature and rights of 
the data subjects. We have been vigilant in balancing the obligation of transparency 
with the obligation to obtain valid consent and the requirement not to inundate the 
person concerned with information
36
. We suggest that the period of conservation is 
the duration of the project TeSLA. In case of duration of TeSLA over the end of the 
project, the retention period for both types of personal data could be the time re-
quired to verify the alert of fraud.  
This consent form must be completed and approved by each student. This form 
is offered to them by a visual display on the user's computer screen at the beginning 
of the service's use to respect the timing for provision of information
37
. This method 
has also the advantage to include the information in one single document in one 
single place
38
. This is intended to facilitate the accessibility and the communication 
of information by ensuring that the data subject has at least once taken note of all 
information relating to the processing of his or her personal data
39
.  
The consent is also specific because the student receives a clear information 
about the privacy policy, which is separate from other text or activities and the stu-
dent has to click in order to give his/her consent. In the text of the consent form, we 
avoided to use unclear terms like “may’, “might”, “possible” as it is pointed out by 
the Article 29 Working Party. These terms are subject to interpretation and do not 




5.2. Ethical considerations 
In order to enrich the definition of consent given in the law, we will take up one 
by one the different characteristics it cites: consent must be free, specific, informed 
and unambiguous. 
The necessity of freedom implies that a request for consent to provide private 
data must include a real possibility of alternative in case of refusal. This may stand 
to reason, but what would be the point of asking for a student's consent to provide 
biometric data if he or she were unable to take the test if he or she refused?  
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Ethical analysis makes it possible to enrich the contribution of Law at this level. 
As we have said, ethics can help to refine our response to technical partners when 
the law remains somewhat vague. Indeed, the latter informs us of the obligation to 
provide a viable alternative but remains vague as to the definition of what consti-
tutes a real alternative able to guarantee the free aspect of a consent. 
What is actually the situation for TeSLA? The system asks the student if he/she 
wishes to be authenticated by the system using the modalities chosen upstream by 
the professor. It is therefore a question of agreeing on a combination of biometric / 
textual analysis instruments, in other words on a set of samples of data to be made 
available. TeSLA, as it was originally conceived, provides two possibilities:  
- The teacher provides the possibility of an examination completely outside the 
context of TeSLA (for example, a classic face-to-face examination). 
- The teacher allows the student to take the exam with another combination of 
TeSLA instruments. 
We noted that this approach derived by the technical partners had certain short-
comings.  
First, it consists in delegating a large part of the very functioning of the system to 
the teacher. They are faced with a system that would require a fairly substantial 
logistical effort in cases of massive refusals, whereas the purpose of the system is 
precisely to avoid the organizational burdens caused by face-to-face examinations. 
This aspect needs to be clarified for reasons of transparency towards future TeSLA 
user institutions. Indeed, it is important that they know what they will incur if con-
sent is not given by the student. One thing that can be done at this level is to further 
clarify these aspects (the necessity to develop an alternative way of exam and the 
limitations of the internal alternative options) in the description of TeSLA to future 
customers, as well as clear warnings in the operating instructions. For the institu-
tions, it is a question of being able to perceive how the system could be implemented 
in their own regulation. 
Second, it is clear from our ethical investigation that a significant proportion of 
the students are unconvinced by the alternative system embedded in TeSLA. They 
believe that if they have little confidence in the way the system processes their data 
or in the reliability of the instruments, switching from one combination of instru-
ments to another will not necessarily reassure them. Concerning this problem, we 
had suggested to the partners to standardize and clarify the uses that would be made 
by teachers by giving indications on the following aspects: Who can access to which 
data? For which purpose? How do TeSLA's instruments process data? These indi-
cations go beyond the simple question of consent but they would make consent more 
informed if they were put forward at the time of the request. 
Finally, this second way of considering an alternative is ethically questionable 
because it does not guarantee equivalence criteria between students. Indeed, on 
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which legitimacy is based an examination that has been passed by students with 
different monitoring criteria? Various abuses are conceivable: students could con-
sciously choose the method that makes it easier for them to cheat, or on the other 
hand they could feel aggrieved by having to take an exam with a heavier supervisory 
method than their classmates. This would impact the very legitimacy of the past 
examination, and by extension the reputation of the institution that proposes it. 
The specificity of consent implies that the nature of the data and the way in which 
the data covered by it are used must be explicitly indicated. We stressed the im-
portance of clearly defining how feedback is treated (more explanation about feed-
backs in the next section). 
 
The question of feedback and its processing will be dealt with more precision in the 
seventh section, but it is important to specify that the definition of this feedback 
processing affects in particular the quality of the request for consent. In this respect, 
we have insisted on the need to extend this concern for clarity in the request for 
consent to the way feedback are exposed and used (and not only basic biometric 
samples). 
Regarding the need to have an informed consent, we fed the reflection with find-
ings of our survey about students' concerns about their understanding of the system. 
These must be taken into account when writing the consent request in order to make 
it both user-centred and easier to access. Highlights from our findings include: 
- The activation period of biometric instruments. 
- The type of data that is collected (picture, voice recording...). 
- The way the data is collected (the continuous aspect). 
- And so, certain behaviors can be avoided to allow the instruments to correctly 
collect the necessary and sufficient data. 
Consent is therefore an important issue to be addressed because it conditions the 
very use of the system. Indeed, the very purpose of TeSLA is to generate trust be-
tween professors and students. To do this, it uses biometric recognition instruments 
to identify students remotely. However, these instruments do not provide confi-
dence in a purely mechanical or automatic way through their use. It is worth con-
sidering the potential drift of such a system if it claims to bring confidence to users 
through a strong and widespread monitoring system. Working on the transparency 
of consent makes it possible to avoid justifying ever greater and deregulated sur-
veillance based on the need for trust. 
 
However, a good request for consent is not limited to a transparent list of the private 
data collected and the work done with it. The system itself must operate clearly and 
unambiguously in order to submit a meaningful request for consent. This principle 
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probably applies to any system requiring private data, but is all the more important 




The transparency obligation is a core requirement of the GDPR. After explaining 
this principle and its objectives, we focus on how this obligation imposes to the 
software developers the openness of their system. Finally, ethical considerations 
give a good overview of possible difficulties in users' understanding and therefore 
of the transparency efforts needed to guarantee the right to information. 
6.1. Legal considerations 
6.1.1. Principle and objectives 
The objective of the transparency obligation is to strengthen the citizens’ control 
over the processing of their personal data. The transparency of the data controller 
permits data subjects to understand the use of their information. In addition, this key 
principle allows individuals to effectively exercise the rights granted by the 
GDPR41. 
To respect the obligations for Member States to processed the personal data fairly, 
we assisted to the emergence of long and unintelligible general conditions of use. 
Needless to say, every citizen accepted them without understanding, or even know-
ing, what he/she was engaging with, without knowing that he/she had just ex-
changed aspects of private life for a service.  
The GDPR intends to reinforce the transparency requirement. It is now clearly 
written in the text that transparency is an obligation for the data controller. Article 
5 states that: "Personal data shall be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent 
manner in relation to the data subject".  
Recital 39 adds: “Any processing of personal data should be lawful and fair. It 
should be transparent to natural persons that personal data concerning them are 
collected, used, consulted or otherwise processed and to what extent the personal 
data are or will be processed. The principle of transparency requires that any in-
formation and communication relating to the processing of those personal data be 
easily accessible and easy to understand, and that clear and plain language be used. 
That principle concerns, in particular, information to the data subjects on the iden-
tity of the controller and the purposes of the processing and further information to 
ensure fair and transparent processing in respect of the natural persons concerned 
and their right to obtain confirmation and communication of personal data con-
cerning them which are being processed. Natural persons should be made aware of 
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risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to the processing of personal data and 
how to exercise their rights in relation to such processing. In particular, the specific 
purposes for which personal data are processed should be explicit and legitimate 
and determined at the time of the collection of the personal data. The personal data 
should be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary for the purposes for 
which they are processed. This requires, in particular, ensuring that the period for 
which the personal data are stored is limited to a strict minimum. Personal data 
should be processed only if the purpose of the processing could not reasonably be 
fulfilled by other means. In order to ensure that the personal data are not kept 
longer than necessary, time limits should be established by the controller for eras-
ure or for a periodic review. Every reasonable step should be taken to ensure that 
personal data which are inaccurate are rectified or deleted. Personal data should 
be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security and confidentiality of 
the personal data, including for preventing unauthorised access to or use of per-
sonal data and the equipment used for the processing." .  
Transparency promotes and develops the empowerment of citizens and is inter-
preted as a mean of enhancing the privacy of users and facilitating the exercise of 
their rights42. Furthermore, the obligation of transparency is intrinsically linked to 
trust. As stated by Article 29 Working Party, “It is about engendering trust in the 
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Fig. 1. Informations requirements 
 
6.1.2. Transparency and openness 
The obligation of transparency is often presented as the cornerstone of the data 
subject's right to information and a duty of communication of the controller. It in-
cludes:    
- Providing information to the data subject in a clear and plain language, 
at the beginning and all along the processing of personal data. In ad-
dition, the data controller must adopt a proactive approach for provid-
ing information and not waiting for an intervention of the data sub-
ject
44
 (see as detailed above and Fig. 1.).  
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- The data controller has to give a permanent access to privacy infor-
mation, even if there is no modification in the terms and conditions. 
In addition, the Article 29 Working Party encourages the data control-
ler to provide express reminders, from time to time, to the data subject 
about the privacy notice, and where this is accessible
45
 (see as detailed 
above). 
However, the obligation of transparency indirectly entails other obligations for the 
controller and a certain openness of the system in order to permit the verification of 
compliance with the GDPR. 
The duty of transparency has two faces. On the one hand, the data subject have some 
rights, such as the right to be informed, the right to have access to some information 
and the right to erasure. On the other hand, the data controller has to prepare him-
self/herself by technical and organisational measures, to answer to the data subject. 
It implies de facto to open the system to the data subject. These two faces are illus-
trated by Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Right for the data subject and corresponding obligations for the data 
controller 
Rights for data subject Duty for data controller 
Right of access To give a secure and online access to 
one’s personal data 
Right to be informed Transparency about the logic and how 
the system works 
Right to have a human intervention and 
contest the decision 
• Procedural rules 
• To receive a clear and com-
prehensive feedback from the 
tools 
Right to erasure To facilitate the deletion in all servers 
 
This duty of transparency could be a constraint on the shoulders of the data control-
ler, who must identify the type of persons concerned and the most intelligible way 
of fulfilling the obligation to inform. However, it could be also a decision-making 
tool for the data controller in the use and management of personal data. In order to 
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fulfil its obligation of information, the data controller has to understand how the 
system works. Thereby, the data controller must know the limits of the tools used 
and can therefore take an enlightened decision on the basis of the outputs of the 
TeSLA system. Transparency then becomes, not only a legal constraint, but a real 
contribution in the academic procedure of decision-making in the case of suspicion 
of cheating by a student. 
6.2. Ethical considerations 
 
The GDPR gives the right to information as a fundamental prerogative, but this 
dimension needs to be further explored ethically. This will then make it possible to 
provide a richer contextual dimension, in a way to relate the standard legal defini-
tion of this right into a practical reality. 
The GDPR's definition of the right to information is not totally satisfactory because 
it cannot (and this is normal for a legal definition) take into account the diversity of 
human behaviors. Indeed, the right to information implies a need of understanding 
on the side of stakeholders. Our ethical fieldwork gives us a good overview of pos-
sible difficulties in users' understanding and therefore of the transparency efforts 
needed to guarantee the right to information. 
 
The comprehension problems demonstrated by our survey participants are diverse. 
On the student side, these concerns lie both in the understanding of biometric in-
struments and the architecture of the system and how it affects the teacher's judg-
ment behind the scenes. 
 
Although many factors may have influenced this lack of understanding regarding 
how the TeSLA instruments work (the lack of explanations received upstream, the 
sometimes confusing context that characterizes a test phase...), it is worrying to note 
how difficult it is for some to access the basic principles of these instruments. The 
capabilities of these instruments were sometimes overestimated, considered at a 
level that goes beyond simple authentication. For example, many students believed 
that the face recognition instrument was able to interpret their actions which is way 
more than only matching enrolment biometric samples with data samples collected 
during assessment activities. Some even thought that someone was watching them 
live via webcam. These interpretations led these students to ask themselves what 
behaviors were expected of them (should we stay in front of the screen during the 
entire activity or not? Should we remove the presence of sheets of paper on the 
desk?). These uncertainties potentially cause a form of anxiety about the system. 
Taking these understanding shortcomings into account is necessary to ensure the 
right to be informed in the context of TeSLA. 
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These aspects concern the understanding of the algorithmic underlying the sys-
tem (the software attached to the instruments are black boxes from the TeSLA sys-
tem perspectives), but the opacity that potentially blurs the vision of student users 
is not limited to them. The feedback that these instruments send back to the teachers 
is also a veil of opacity towards the students. Legal and ethical issues regarding the 
feedback will be addressed in the following section. We would like to stress the 
potential lack of access by students to these data (cfr: the "right of access"). Indeed, 
these feedback data are subject to the right of information. Students are seeking an 
opportunity to see how professors manage them and whether they are able to justify 
their possible charges with supporting evidence.  
Another legal aspect that also concerned our research was the right to a human 
intervention and to challenge the decision taken on the basis of TeSLA's indications. 
The students' concerns, or even defeatism, about the difficulty to challenge a deci-
sion that would have been taken on the basis of the system led us to highlight the 
importance of implementing TeSLA according to the rules specific to each univer-
sity. Of course, we could not study all the possibilities of interaction between 
TeSLA and internal regulations on a case-by-case basis, but we are contributing to 
the implementation of an instruction manual. This will contain general principles of 
use allowing universities to easily set up a clear modus operandi. By clarifying TeS-
LA's role in the teacher's judgment of his or her students, the notice should enable 
each student to challenge the charges against him or her and hold the teacher ac-
countable if necessary. 
The issue of transparency is crucial because it highlights a common dilemma in the 
development of such systems. On the one hand, it must be easily accessible in order 
to allow as many people as possible to use it (and this aim of "democratizing" uni-
versity courses is an argument claimed by TeSLA project) and on the other hand 
the use of technical tools (here biometric instruments) necessarily leads to a certain 
complexity of the system. This complexity can hinder users with the least techno-
logical literacy (both from the teacher and student point of view). 
 
In this case, the ethical approach raises questions that go beyond the scope of the 
Law. Beyond the processing of private data, there is the question of the usability of 
the system and its potentially discriminatory nature. Ethically speaking, it is obvious 
that it is necessary to ensure the greatest possible accessibility to it, whatever the 
level of technological literacy of the person. This is of course also linked to the 
question of trust that we have previously mentioned: how the system can claim to 
generate trust if it excludes some of the users to whom it potentially addresses? We 
have tried to favor an approach that would not simply consider that “people have to 
adapt to technologies, period” by the comprehension of their fears. 
The use of TeSLA by teachers must be understood in terms of "clues". As TeS-
LA's feedbacks do not constitute self-evident evidence, a possible accusation of 
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cheating must be based on more solid materials than the mere presence of a litigious 
number returned by one of the biometric instruments. 
 
As a result, TeSLA interacts with the cheating regulations previously in place in 
each university. On the institutional side, it is important to understand what TeSLA 
produces before integrating it. The latter already includes, in a way, a specific "def-
inition" of what is considered as cheating. Authentication using face recognition 
implies, for example, that a third party cannot take the place of the student "in front 
of the screen" for the duration of the evaluation activity. However, TeSLA does not 
regulate the interactions that these two people would have outside the duration of 
the assessment, or even during the assessment (if speech recognition is not enabled, 
there is nothing to prevent them from talking during the activity). 
 
Before any integration of TeSLA, the following two questions must therefore be 
asked by the institutions: 
- What are the typical fraud situations facing our institution? After detailing them 
field by field (the way of cheating is not the same depending on the field of study, 
of course), institutions must look at which of these situations TeSLA potentially 
thwarts or not. 
 
- Are the detections made by TeSLA instruments relevant to our institution? It is in 
fact the opposite question. The system user guide should contain a detailed descrip-
tion of each instrument and what it is capable of reporting. On the basis of this, the 




The aims of this section are to explain the legal framework surrounding automated 
decision-making and the related rights for the students, in particular the right to 
obtain, on request, knowledge of the reasoning underlying data processing. A par-
ticular point of attention is the possibility of using the results given by the TeSLA 
system to profile students that are repeatedly cheating. It is also important for teach-
ers using the software to understand the delivered indicators as well as how to in-
terpret and integrate them into internal rules of each institution. 
7.1. Definition  
As showed in Fig. 2., Feedback consists of confidence indexes comparing enrol-
ment sample(s) (of biometric or text-based data) with samples collected during an 
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activity for each learner. The feedback is classified by instrument (a tab by instru-
ment) and showed chronologically for each activity in the case of biometric instru-
ments (one index is sent for each sample collected every 30 seconds/1 minute more 
or less). 
Each metric included in tables appear in green, yellow or red according to their 
value in comparison with a threshold. This aims to facilitate teachers’ interpretation 
of these abstract numbers, giving a simple indication. However, even if the teachers 
are supposed to interpret freely these numbers, the thresholds and the coloration of 
feedback will influence his/her later decision and perception of learners’ work. 
 
 





7.2. Legal considerations 
The result given by TeSLA is a personal data in the sense that it is information 
relating to an identifiable person
46
. Consequently, all regulations relating to the pro-
tection of personal data must be respected.  
7.2.1. Legal guarantees 
The Article 29 Working Party defines the concept of automated decision-making 
as "the ability to make decisions by technological means without human involve-
ment. Automated decisions can be made with or without profiling"47.  
The Article 29 Working Party is sensitive to a decision that has "the potential to 
significantly influence the circumstances, behaviour or choices if the individuals 
concerned"48.  
If by an algorithmic method the TeSLA system is able to determine a result of cheat-
ing, or at least a percentage of probability, of non-matching between the exam and 
the enrolment process, it seems that this can potentially affect significantly the stu-
dent's situation in that it may lead to a refusal to grant the diploma or certificate.  
In the TeSLA project, the collection and use of personal data from the learners 
are based on their freely given, specific and informed consent. The consent, that 
needs to be confirmed by an express statement and a positive action, is an exception 
that permits the use of automated decision-making. There are several safeguards. 
Firstly, the data controller has to inform properly the data subject about the exist-
ence of an automated decision-making49. They have the right to be informed about 
the logic involved, the explanation of the mechanism and how the system works. It 
is not mandatory to enter into details on the functioning of algorithms50. These in-
formation must be provided by the data controller when the data are collected. As a 
consequence, it does not concern information about how the decision was reached 
by the system in a concrete situation51. 
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Secondly, students have the right to obtain a human intervention, to express their 
opinion and to contest the decision52. This is of a crucial importance considering the 
fact that special categories of personal data from students are used in the project. 
Recital 71 of the GDPR specifies that they need to have the possibility to obtain an 
explanation of the decision reached. It goes beyond a simple right of information as 
it requires to give an ex post information on the concrete decision. It implies for the 
data controller to understand and to be able to explain in a comprehensive way the 
algorithmic functioning of the system53. In the context of TeSLA, the teacher has to 
receive a clear and comprehensive feedback from the tools.  
The possibility to obtain an explanation of the decision reached is not mandatory as 
it is in a recital and not in the article itself, but permits a real and meaningful possi-
bility to express an opinion and to decide to contest the decision or not. The Article 
29 Working Party insists on the role of the controller in the transparency of the 
processing54. 
Thirdly, the data controller must ensure that someone who has the authority and 
ability to remove the decision will review the automated decision55.  
Fourthly, the Article 29 Working Party advises the data controller to carry out 
frequent assessments on the personal data collected and used. The curacy of the 
personal data and the quality of the tools used for the processing are core elements 
of the lawfulness of the system. This is particularly relevant when special categories 
of personal data, such as biometrics, are processed. The data controller, with the 
help of the data processor, should not only check the quality and prevent errors or 
inaccuracies at the time of the collection and the technical implementation of the 
system but in a continuous way as long as the data is not deleted or anonymized56. 
Beside the right not to be subject to and automated decision, the right of access 
for the student includes the right to know “the existence of automated decision-
making (…) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic 
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such pro-
cessing for the data subject”
57
. It implies for the data controller to understand and 
to be able to explain in a comprehensive way the algorithmic functioning of the 
system but is not a plenary algorithmic transparency
58
.  
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In the TeSLA context, the teacher has to receive a clear and comprehensive feed-
back from the tools. So there is a right for the students to know the data being pro-
cessed, the criteria and the importance of each criteria but it is not a real full algo-
rithmic transparency because we need also to take into account potential intellectual 
property rights on the software and trade secret on algorithms
59
. 
The modernization of the Convention 108+ gives the right to obtain, on request, 
knowledge of the reasoning underlying data processing where the results of such 
processing are applied to him or her60. 
In conclusion, if the teacher or the institutional committee have suspicions, it is 
important that they are able to explain to the students how the system works and to 
give, on student’s request, knowledge of the reasoning underlying the data pro-
cessing and the possibility to obtain an explanation of the decision reached.  
To respect the right to rectification and to object, it is also important that the student 
can demonstrate that his or her behaviour was not optimal for the functioning of the 
system but it is not for that much a case of fraud. 
7.2.2. Feedback and profiling 
The aim of this subsection is to consider the possibility to use the feedback given 
by TeSLA system for profiling activities 
According to article 4.4 of the GDPR, profiling means “any form of automated 
processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate cer-
tain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or pre-
dict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situ-
ation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or 
movements”. 
If the data controller wants to collect the repeated cases of fraud from the same 
student with TeSLA (the biometrics data will be used to certify the identity of the 
student), there is no explicit and clear mention of profiling or collection of personal 
data in order to combine them with others to establish a certain profile of a student 
in the consent form. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the consent 
can never legitimate a disproportionate processing
61
. 
We can take a second hypothesis: If the envisaged activity is the establishment 
of blacklists
62
 with identities of students that are considered as cheaters, there is no 
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prohibition as such for that. However, these listing need to be done in accordance 
with the GDPR; transparency, data minimization, exercise of the right of access, 
information to the data subject on the fact that he/she is on the list, limited time of 
conservation, accuracy and mechanisms to avoid errors in the identification of stu-
dents included and errors in the information mentioned and a secured access
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. 
Nevertheless, if the database needs to contain also biometrics data to prove the 
identity of the learner, there is no explicit consent from the students. Consequently, 
the data controller has no ground to legitimate such activity. Moreover, this is sub-
ject to the condition that the processing of personal data is not contrary to the exer-
cise of the fundamental right to education and therefore could not be regarded as 
unlawful64. 
7.3. Ethical considerations 
Addressing the feedback system is important because we do not know in advance 
how teachers will use this feature. This raises questions in terms of fair treatment of 
students. How can an accusation of cheating be justified in front of them if the 
teacher is not able to explain how he used the system? How can we avoid a totally 
hazardous use of the system that could produce uncontrollable effects of judgement? 
This is a major issue regarding the second aspect cited by the legal approach: the 
right to have a human intervention. 
One of the topics we discussed with the professors during our ethical survey was 
their understanding and use of these index tables. Five out eight teachers found the 
feedback hard to understand and had difficulties to answer the following questions: 
What does each number mean? How are you supposed to interpret them concretely? 
What does the green/yellow/red coloration of the feedback really mean? Their an-
swers were often unclear, and based largely on the idea that this has to be judged on 
a case-by-case basis. Some others, however, complained head-on about the way 
feedback was presented in the interface. The comments of some professors even 
suggested that they would use this feedback in a way that goes beyond the frame-
work initially imagined in the project, for example by developing a long-term stu-
dent profiling based on the confidence indexes returned by the TeSLA instruments. 
Then, it was necessary to intervene ethically on this aspect of the system. 
                                                          
criteria according to the kind of blacklist in question, which generally implies ad-verse and 
prejudicial effects for the individuals included thereon and which may be discriminate 
against a group of people by barring them access to a specific service or harming their rep-
utation” ; Article 29 Working Party-WP65 2002, pp. 2-3.  
63
 See article 5 and Recitals 39 and 50 of the GDPR. See also, Article 29 Working Party-
WP65 2002, pp. 8-12. 
64
 Burton and Poullet 2006, p. 109. 
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A dilemma has arisen in the face of this observation: what should we do to make 
the use of feedback less ambiguous and what is the status that should be attributed 
to them? Should they have decision-making and justification powers or are they just 
indicators that need to be informed by other evidence?  
This dilemma is materialized in the way trust indicators are presented in the 
teacher's interface. These are exposed in a very raw way, as we have explained. 
However, some professors imagined that they would actually be presented in a more 
aggregated and summarized form, allowing for more immediate use and requiring 
less interpretation work. The advantage of this second way to perceive feedback 
would be to reduce the random aspect of teachers' understanding of the indexes. On 
the other hand, this version of the system would tend to “pre-decide” who is a cheat-
ing student and who is not in the teacher's place, and so contribute to an even more 
automated decision process. It is to avoid this pitfall and leave each institution free 
to decide how to use the system that the project has kept a very rough exposure of 
the data.  
However, it is our ethical responsibility to insist on the limits of these indexes 
(that they must be assisted with other means to justify a suspicion of fraud) and to 
give advice on the use of these index tables. These should help to answer the fol-
lowing questions: What to consider when there is a whole spot with numbers written 
in red on the interface (which would correspond to a long while without a correct 
matching)? What could be the reasons for red numbers outside the attempt to mis-
lead the system (e.g., a non-optimal biometric data collection environment)? On the 
other hand, which cheating scenarios seem to be difficult to deal with via TeSLA? 
TeSLA's feedback raises the question of how to interpret the results returned by 
biometric instruments in the context of continuous authentication. Indeed, the spec-
ificity of TeSLA is that biometrics is not used from time to time (for example, in an 
airport to authenticate passengers when crossing the border) but throughout an ac-
tivity. Biometrics, in the context of TeSLA, goes beyond its usual role of authenti-
cation, in fact: student behaviour can be attributed to certain feedbacks. What does 
a negative result mean? That the student was replaced? That someone else passed 
in front of the webcam field? That the student went away for a few moments? 
 
This diversion from the more "traditional" uses of biometrics raises many questions. 
Such as the fact that use of biometrics in decision-making could lead to random and 
arbitrary forms of decisions: it is difficult to know how professors will deal with 
such feedbacks if they are not provided with a minimum of clarification. 
 
In this regard, it should however be noted that an argument in favor of the project 
is its flexibility and the fact that it does not impose a way of using it. The system 
provides "clues" that the student may have cheated (the teacher must then still prove 
it with means that exceed TeSLA). The feedbacks do not therefore say head-on "this 
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student cheated", teachers are free to interpret feedbacks differently depending on 
the context. Nonetheless, this argument in favor of TeSLA may mask the potential 
pitfalls of a completely deregulated use. If no minimal standardization of the use of 
TeSLA feedback (e. g. through a user manual for teachers) is developed, how can 
students trust the decisions that will be made using the system? 
 
8. Conclusions 
TeSLA involves the processing of personal data when using face recognition, 
voice recognition and keystroke dynamics to verify student’s identity during dis-
tance examinations and pedagogical activities. In this chapter, we focused on three 
privacy aspects: the need to have a valid consent, the transparency principle and the 
feedback given by the system to the user. 
Firstly, as TeSLA is working with a special category of personal data, the GDPR 
requires an explicit consent. The consent form established during the project in-
cludes information that helps the students understand what will be done with their 
personal data. The consent form must be completed and approved by each student. 
The consent is also specific because the students receive a clear information about 
the privacy policy, which is separate from other texts, and the students have to click 
to give their consent. From ethical surveys, we learned that students require clear 
information about who can have access to their personal data, the activation period 
of biometrics instruments, the continuous or non-continuous collection of personal 
data and the behaviors to be avoided to ensure the proper functioning of the system. 
This information has to be given to the students to have a real and informed consent 
and to adopt a user-centric approach.  
Secondly, the transparency principle involves a right, for the data subject, to re-
ceive information, and a corollary obligation for the data controller to provide in-
formation in a clear and plain language. The information should be given at the 
beginning and all along the processing of personal data. While the GDPR estab-
lishes a list of information to be provided, ethical analysis could highlight some 
particular requirements from the data subject. In TeSLA, the students seem to have 
difficulties to really understand how the system is working and what the TeSLA 
possibilities are. Ethical considerations may therefore justify the provision of addi-
tional information to that required by law, in order to ensure a non-discrimina-
tory use of the system.  
Thirdly, we focused on the feedback given by TeSLA and the teachers that used 
it. A concern is that the students cannot effectively exercise their right to object if 
they do not receive information about how the system works and how the decision 
was made by the professor. Accordingly, a decision had to be made between giving 
raw information and leaving the interpretation of these feedback to teachers, on the 
one hand, and giving immediately interpretable results, on the other hand. As this 
32  
second option would lead to pre-decide for the teachers, it has been decided to keep 
a very rough exposure of the data. 
From the above, it stems that if the law regulates the processing of personal data, 
ethical considerations make it possible to concretize the rules imposed by the GDPR 
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Glossary  
Biometrics data Personal data resulting from specific technical processing re-
lating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural per-
son, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person (Article 
4.14 of the GDPR). 
Consent Any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the 
data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative 
action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her 
(Article 4.11 of the GDPR). 
Data controller The natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other 
body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data (Article 4.7 of the GDPR). 
Data processor The natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other 
body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller (Article 4.8 of the 
GDPR). 
Data subject The identified or identifiable natural person.  
Personal data Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors 
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity of that natural person (Article 4.1 of the GDPR). 
Processing Any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal 
data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as col-
lection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, re-
trieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction (Ar-
ticle 4.2 of the GDPR). 
Profiling Any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the 
use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, 
in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's perfor-
mance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliabil-
ity, behaviour, location or movements (Article 4.3 of the GDPR). 
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Pseudonymisation The processing of personal data in such a manner that the 
personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use 
of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept sepa-
rately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the per-
sonal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person (Article 
4.5 of the GDPR). 
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Acronyms list 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation 
HEI Higher Education Institution 
LTI Learning Tools Interoperability 
TEP TeSLA e-Assessment Portal 
TIP TeSLA Identity Provider 
VLE Virtual Learning Environment  
